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GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986 RECOMMENDATION FOR ORGAIZATIONAL REFORM
It can be argued that the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) of 1986 and the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) who have lead since this legislation have made significant contributions to influence the nation. While there were eight purposes identified by Congress in passing the GNA, the focus of this paper is on the second purpose which is: To improve the military advice to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense.
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After reviewing the roles and functions required of the members of the JCS, the dilemma is clear. The JCS have the challenge to effectively provide the best military advice to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense from a joint perspective, while they are also responsible as the Service Chiefs to argue the interests of their respective Armed
Forces. The problem is they are part of a system that appears to be out of balance; a system that requires them to divide their interest, loyalties, and time between both responsibilities, which at times may be in conflict. This paper will critically examine these dual-hatted responsibilities and recommend a course of action to effectively resolve this dilemma. The thesis of this paper will focus directly on the question: Has the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 created the organizational structure that best provides military advice to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense?
To answer that question the paper will first focus on the salient background points of the 1986 GNA. Once it succinctly lays the foundation of the GNA's key points, the paper will identify both recent and pass issues concerning the roles and functions of the members of JCS.
Specifically, it will look at the dual-hatted responsibilities possessed by the Service Chiefs and as members of the JCS under the two main issues of parochialism and time. Finally, the paper will recommend a change to the current structure of the military to improve the military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense.
Today, more than ever, the fast paced and globally complex Department of Defense political-military arena requires the National Command Authority to receive the best military advice in a timely fashion. It is of the up most importance to ensure the National Command Authority receives relevant, timely, and unbiased advice from the members of JCS and Service
Chiefs. To transform the Department of Defense, compliment the current Revolution in Military
Affairs, and ensure the United States military will succeed in the 21st century, we must have the best organizational structure that allows our military leaders to fully execute their responsibilities!
BACKGROUND ON THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986.
Today, We often take the post-Cold war success of our Armed Forces for granted. From Haiti to Bosnia, to the Taiwan Strait, to Liberia, to the skies over Iraq, they have achieved great success at minimal cost in nearly fifty operations since Desert Storm. Quality people, superior organization, unity of command, and considerable skill in joint and combined operations have been central to that achievement. All these factors owe a great debt to the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986. 2 John M. Shalikashvili
Although the above quote was stated over six years ago, on the tenth anniversary of the GNA, it is still relevant today. The GNA emphasized the need for the unfettered advice of the CJCS as the principal military advisor vice the collective advice of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to improve the advice to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. An additional main concern stemming from Congress was the fact that the services where not effectively integrating and providing joint warfighting capability, and the combatant commanders needed more authority to execute missions. This led to the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act's eight purposes:
To reorganize DoD and strengthen civilian authority in the DoD; to improve the military advice provided to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense; to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands; to ensure that the authority of commanders of unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands; to increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning; to provide for the more efficient use of defense resources; to improve joint officer management policies; otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve DoD management and administration.
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It has been sixteen years since the GNA was signed into law. Most people who have studied and worked in the DoD would agree that overall Jointness has drastically improved.
Since the GNA numerous initiatives have improved the Armed Services' joint operational success. My analysis of the GNA's success indicates they can be best clarified in six points of discussion:
• The first objective of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act was to enhance civilian authority in DoD, strengthening the Secretary of Defense's authority.
Under requirements from the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act, the Secretary of Defense published the defense planning guidance and more responsibilities went to Service Secretaries vice Service Chiefs.
• • Established the positions of Joint Specialty Officers and focused on improving the quality of officer in joint designated billets.
-JSO tour is a requirement before an officer can be promoted to the Flag level.
-Improved Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), especially at the Service Intermediate Level and Top Level Schools through formal curriculum guidance and assessments.
• Enhanced Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff's ability to establish joint doctrine, planning, training, and joint interoperability.
-Joint doctrine and joint publications established.
-Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process and Joint Warfare
Capabilities Assessments (JWCAs), and CJCS's exercise program.
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Even with all of these improvements in jointness and the institutional changes that have occurred to create these successes, the overarching issue is whether this Act needs to be While all of the reasons stated above could give justification for a comprehensive review of the legislation associated with the GNA, the focus of this paper is only on the second purpose of the Act: To improve the military advice to the President, National Security Council, and
Secretary of Defense. The next section of the paper will focus on the second purpose of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act, and review present and past concerns on the roles and functions of all the members of the JCS.
MILITARY ADVICE FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. THE ISSUE OF "PAROCHIALISM" --BALANCING SERVICE AND JOINT REQUIRMENTS.
While protecting parochial service interest can be a positive response if you are serving at the service headquarters; however, today and into the future, the U. S. Armed Forces will continue to serve and operate together. To achieve true Jointness, all U. S. Armed Forces' officers must set their specific service interest aside (not their pride) in respect to joint interest to the Nation, the President of the United States, the Congress, and the Department of Defense. The system is simply out of balance between service interest and joint interest. Because of the way it is set up there is a basic, built-in conflict of interest between the role of Joint Chiefs of Staff members and the role of service chiefs. Indeed, it was deliberately designed that way to protect parochial service interests even at the expense of the joint interests of the Nation, the President, the Congress, and the Department of Defense. The focus of this argument is that providing effective advice to the President, National
Security Council, and Secretary of Defense has been and will continue to be in jeopardy unless meaningful reform on this issue is initiated. In a latter section, this paper will examine a Although the law provides for a chief's dissent to be forwarded to civilian authorities, in practice this does not happen frequently. The chiefs limit their dissent, for the most part, to the confines of the JCS. They seem to be satisfied so long as they believe their views are being heard and considered. The chairman benefits from candid advice from the service chiefs and enjoys multiple advocacies from both service and joint views as he develops his own advice to the NCA. This may mean that the chairman now gets much better, unfettered advice from his chiefs than the Secretary of Defense or the President ever did under the old system. But relying solely on the chairman for military advice may run the risk that the Secretary of Defense, the NSC, and the President are less apprised of alternative options by not hearing the force of argument and differing military voices and views.
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One underlying issue in this statement by Roman and Tarr is: Are the President, the National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense now less likely to get the experience and mature leadership views from the Service Chiefs as the Chairman now dominates the advice role from an organization and structure perspective. Although there are differences of opinion on this subject and there are facts that could support either view, we need to investigate organizational structures to provide military advice that may not be personality or organizationally limiting as is the case now. However before addressing proposals for reform, the second major problem that effects advice is the issue of "Time". The paper will now cover whether the Service Chiefs have the time to devote to joint matters and advice, as they try to balance the duties of their service with their duties as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. hearings that may include a broad review of the entire Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986. 22 Although there is nothing out officially concerning the hearings and investigation, it is believed by the spokesperson that an investigation may be conducted early next year. Further, the spokesperson believed one of the objectives of the bipartisan investigation will be to assess the balance between the services' interest and the joint interest that has been very successful in the past.
MILITARY ADVICE FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: THE ISSUE OF: "TIME" --BALANCING SERVICE AND JOINT DUTIES.

It has already been established that the issue of the
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To focus on the one issue of how to improve the military advice provided to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense may require a much broader review of just the dual-hatting issue discussed in the paper to date. This may entail a review of the organization of the Department of Defense, Service Secretaries, and the organizations and responsibilities to best implement the National Strategy for Homeland Defense. Much of this is beyond the scope of this paper, but the paper makes the point that it would be difficult to just review the one provision of how to provide the best military advice without reviewing the entire Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986. Hence, the paper advocates that if the advice questioned is studied, then studying other parts of the Act would also be appropriate. However, the next part of the paper will now advocate an approach that focuses the second purpose of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act: To improve the military advice to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. The major advantages of the NMAC over the current JCS system are threefold. First, the make-up of the council would end the perception that joint adviceespecially resource advice-is inextricably linked to service parochialism and ignores economic realities. Second, it would offer cross-service operational resource advice to CJCS and civilian decision makers. Third, it would be a full time body whose members focused on the formation, implementation, and resourcing of a viable national military strategy designed to protect the U. S. interests in the post Cold War world.
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As General Jones, Commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps, suggested, "institutional changes may be needed to make certain the power of the Joint Chiefs is not eroded by other duties." 27 It is this institution change that this recommendation provides. The advantages of the NMAC are clear, but are there any disadvantages in establishing a NMAC.
NMAC DISADVANTAGES
The main disadvantage in establishing a NMAC would be the inherent controversy on the service members who would be selected for the positions. Although the make up of the NMAC is separate and distinct from the Service Chiefs, the members of the NMAC are flag officers who could have recently left their respective services. Former Service Chiefs could be eligible for selection as a NMAC member. This membership could prompt accusations from
Congress that the NMAC is still parochial or still a "good old buddy system" with their Service
Chief friends. It could be stated that the establishment of the NMAC is basically the same as the former JCS with just a new title. Another argument is the current duel-hatted Service
Chiefs/JCS paradigm is desirable and productive the way it is presently instituted. It could be argued that the Service Chiefs' present roles and functions provide them great insight of their individual services, and this is greatly sought-after when discussing and making decisions concerning joint issues. Another perspective is that Congress desires the duel-hatted paradigm.
"Congress has been and will remain a major obstacle to JCS reform since it may have the most to lose. As a former special assistant to the Secretary of Defense has stated:"
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The attitude of the Congress towards JCS has been essentially opportunistic.
When it has appeared that there might be profit in it, members of Congress occasionally have tried to play off the chiefs against their civilian superiors, though usually without much success. As a whole, the Congress has appeared happy to have JCS remain a weak compromise organization.
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The above sentiment in Congress could still hold true and be the same basis for why the JCS is not abolished and replaced by a NMAC.
REFORM DECISION
The decision on reforming the DoD is clearly upon the shoulders of the Congress. The
Goldwaters-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 was a landmark move towards DoD reform.
The challenge in these uncertain times is to improve the legislation in order to improve the DoD.
The scope of this paper has been to critically examine the Service Chiefs' dual-hatted responsibilities and recommend a course of action to effectively resolve this dilemma. The WORD COUNT= 6594
